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Blind quantum computing is a new secure quantum computing protocol where a client who does
not have any sophisticated quantum technlogy can delegate her quantum computing to a server
without leaking any privacy. It is known that a client who has only a measurement device can
perform blind quantum computing [T. Morimae and K. Fujii, Phys. Rev. A 87, 050301(R) (2013)].
It has been an open problem whether the protocol can enjoy the verification, i.e., the ability of client
to check the correctness of the computing. In this paper, we propose a protocol of verification for
the measurement-only blind quantum computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blind quantum computing [1–10] is a secure delegated
quantum computing, where a client (Alice), who does not
have enough quantum technology, delegates her quantum
computing to a server (Bob), who has a fully-fledged
quantum computer, without leaking any information
about her computation to Bob. A blind quantum com-
puting protocol for almost classical Alice was first pro-
posed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi [1] by using
the measurement-based model due to Raussendorf and
Briegel [11]. In their protocol, Alice only needs a device
which emits randomly rotated single-qubit states. Later
it was shown that weak coherent pulses, instead of single-
photon states, are sufficient for blind quantum computa-
tion [5]. Recently, it was shown that blind quantum com-
puting can be verifiable [2, 9, 10]. Here, verifiable means
that Alice can test Bob’s computation [2, 9, 10]. The ver-
ifiability is an important requirement, since Alice cannot
recalculate the result of the delegated computation by
herself to check the correctness (remember that she does
not have any quantum computer), and therefore if there
is no verification method, she might be palmed off with a
wrong result by a fishy company who tries to sell a fake
quantum computer [9, 10]. The verifiable blind protocol
was experimentally demonstrated with a photonic qubit
system [9, 10].
Recently, another type of blind quantum computing
protocol was proposed in Ref. [3]. In this protocol, Alice
needs only a device that can measure quantum states.
One advantage of this protocol is that the security is
device independent [12, 13, 20–22], and is based on the
no-signaling principle [16], which is more fundamental
than quantum physics. However, it has been an open
problem whether the protocol can enjoy verification.
In this paper, we propose a verification protocol for the
measurement-only blind quantum computing. We will
propose two protocols. Interestingly, our protocols are
based on the combination of two different concepts from
different fields: the no-signaling principle [16] from the
foundation of physics and the topological quantum error
correcting code [14, 15, 17] from a practical application in
quantum information. The no-signaling principle means
that a shared quantum (or more general) state cannot
be used to transmit information. It is one of the most
central principles in physics, and known to be more fun-
damental than quantum physics (i.e., there is a theory
which is more non-local than quantum physics but does
not violate the no-signaling principle [16]). The topolog-
ical quantum error correcting code is a specific type of
the quantum error correcting code which cleverly uses the
topological order of exotic quantum symmetry-breaking
systems to globally encode logical states.
II. TOPOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT-BASED
QUANTUM COMPUTATION
The Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal state |RHG〉 is the
three-dimensional graph state with the elementary cell
given in Fig. 1 (a). Defects in the graph state are cre-
ated by Z measurements on |RHG〉 as usual in the cluster
measurement-based model. Topological braidings of de-
fect tubes can implement some Clifford gates [14, 15, 17].
Non-Clifford gates, that are necessary for the universal
quantum computation, are implemented by the magic
state preparation and distillation [18]. A string of Z op-
erators acting on the resource state, which has at least
one open edge, is considered as an error, and its edge(s)
is detected by syndrome measurements of cubicles of X
operators (Fig. 1 (b)). A string of Z operators on the re-
source states, which connects or surrounds defects (Fig. 1
(c)), is not detected, and can be a logical error. Local
adaptive measurements can implement quantum compu-
tation as well as syndrome error detection.
III. FIRST PROTOCOL
Let us explain our first protocol. The basic idea of
our protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2: Bob prepares the
resource state, and Alice performs measurements.
More precisely, our protocol runs as follows (Fig. 3).
First, Bob prepares a universal resource state, and
sends each qubit of it to Alice one by one (Fig. 3
(a)). Alice measures each qubit until she remotely
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FIG. 1: The topological measurement-based quantum
computation. (a) The elementary cell of the Raussendorf-
Harrington-Goyal state. Green balls are qubits, and red bonds
are CZ gates. (b) The error detection. Red strings are errors.
Green boxes are syndrome operators. (c) Undetected errors
or logical operations. Blue tubes are defects. Red and yellow
strings are strings of operators, which surround or connect
defects, respectively.
Alice's laboratory
Bob's laboratory
FIG. 2: Our setup. Bob first prepares a resource state. Bob
next sends each particle to Alice one by one. Alice measures
each particle according to her algorithm.
creates the N -qubit state, σq|ΨP 〉, in Bob’s labora-
tory (Fig. 3 (b)), where σq ≡
⊗N
j=1X
xj
j Z
zj
j with q ≡
(x1, ..., xN , z1, ..., zN ) ∈ {0, 1}
2N is the byproduct of the
measurement-based quantum computation [11], and Xj
and Zj are Pauli operators acting on jth qubit. The
state |ΨP 〉 ≡ P
(
|R〉 ⊗ |+〉⊗N/3 ⊗ |0〉⊗N/3
)
, is the N -
qubit state, where |R〉 is an N/3-qubit universal resource
state of the measurement-based quantum computation
encoded with a quantum error-correcting code of the code
distance d. (The size of |R〉 and the number of traps are
optimal, since if there are too many traps, the efficiency
of the computation becomes small, whereas if there are
too few traps, the probability of detecting malicious Bob
becomes small.) For example, |R〉 can be the N/3-qubit
Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal state [14, 15] with suffi-
ciently many magic states being already distilled. (The
Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal state is the resource state
of the topological measurement-based quantum comput-
ing [14, 15]. In stead of the RHG state, any other
quantum error correcting code can be utilized. There-
fore, we can also assume that |R〉 is a normal resource
state of the measurement-based quantum computation
encoded with a quantum error-correcting code.) We de-
fine |+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), and P is an N -qubit permuta-
tion, which keeps the order of qubits in |R〉. This per-
mutation is randomly chosen by Alice and kept secret to
Bob.
Alice(a) Bob
Alice(b) Bob    q P
Alice(c) Bob
FIG. 3: Our protocol. Here, |ΨP 〉 ≡ P (|R〉 ⊗ |+〉
⊗N/3 ⊗
|0〉⊗N/3), P is a N-qubit permutation, and |R〉 is a universal
resource state.
Throughout this paper, we assume that there is no
communication channel from Alice to Bob. Then, due
to the no-signaling principle, Bob cannot learn anything
about P [3]. If Bob can learn something about P , Al-
ice can transmit some message to Bob by encoding her
message into P , which contradicts to the no-signaling
principle.
Bob sends each qubit of σq|ΨP 〉 to Alice one by one,
and Alice does the measurement-based quantum compu-
tation on σq|ΨP 〉 with correcting σq (Fig. 3 (c)). This
means that before measuring jth qubit of σq|ΨP 〉 she
applies σ†q |j on jth qubit, where σ
†
q |j is the restriction of
σ†q on jth qubit. For example, (I ⊗ XZ ⊗ Z)|2 = XZ.
Qubits belonging to |R〉 are used to implement the Al-
ice’s desired quantum computation. States |0〉 and |+〉
are used as “traps” [2]. In other words, she measures Z
on |0〉 and X on |+〉, and if she obtains the minus re-
sult (i.e., |1〉 or |−〉 state), she aborts the protocol. If
results are plus for all traps, she accepts the result of the
measurement-based quantum computation on |R〉.
IV. VERIFIABILITY
Now we show that if all measurements on traps show
the correct results, the probability that a logical state of
Alice’s computation is changed is exponentially small. In
other words, the probability that Alice is fooled by Bob
is exponentially small. Hence, our protocol is verifiable.
Since Bob might be dishonest, he might deviate from
the above procedure. His general attack is a creation
of a different state ρ instead of σq |ΨP 〉. If he is hon-
est, ρ = σq |ΨP 〉〈ΨP |σ
†
q . If he is not honest, ρ can be
any state. However, for any N -qubit state ρ, there ex-
ists a completely-positive-trace-preserving (CPTP) map
3which satisfies ρ =
∑
j Ejσq|ΨP 〉〈ΨP |σ
†
qE
†
j , where Ej ≡∑
α C
α
j σα, is a Kraus operator of the CPTP map, and
Cαj is a complex number (see Appendix A). Since E
†
jEj
is a POVM, I =
∑
j E
†
jEj =
∑
j
∑
α,β C
α∗
j C
β
j σ
†
ασβ , we
obtain
∑
j
∑
α |C
α
j |
2 = 1.
Bob does not know q. Therefore, from Bob’s view
point, the state is averaged over all q:
1
4N
∑
q
∑
j
σ†qEjσq|ΨP 〉〈ΨP |σ
†
qE
†
jσq
=
1
4N
∑
q
∑
j,α,β
Cαj C
β∗
j σ
†
qσασq|ΨP 〉〈ΨP |σ
†
qσ
†
βσq
=
1
4N
∑
q
∑
j,α
|Cαj |
2σ†qσασq|ΨP 〉〈ΨP |σ
†
qσ
†
ασq
=
∑
j,α
|Cαj |
2σα|ΨP 〉〈ΨP |σ
†
α
=
∑
α
C˜ασα|ΨP 〉〈ΨP |σ
†
α, (1)
where C˜α ≡
∑
j |C
α
j |
2 and
∑
α C˜α =
∑
α
∑
j |C
α
j |
2 = 1.
Here, we have used the following equations [19]
∑
q
σ†qσασqρσ
†
qσ
†
βσq = 0 (2)
1
4N
∑
q
σ†qσασqρσ
†
qσ
†
ασq = σαρσ
†
α
for any ρ and α 6= β. The second equation is easy to
show. For a proof of Eq. (2), see Appendix B. Equation
(1) shows that we can assume that Bob’s attack is the
“random Pauli” attack, i.e., Bob randomly applies Pauli
operators on each qubit.
Bob’s attacks after creating ρ can also be included in
the preparation of ρ. This is understood as follows. Let
us assume that, after creating ρ, Bob sends a subsystem
S1 of ρ to Alice, and then Alice measures all particles
of S1. After this Alice’s measurement, Bob might apply
an operation on another subsystem S2 of ρ which has
not been sent to Alice. However, Bob cannot know Al-
ice’s measurement angles and results on S1 due to the
no-signaling principle, and therefore Bob’s operation on
S2 is independent of Alice’s measurements on S1. Fur-
thermore, Bob’s operation on S2 commutes with Alice’s
measurements on S1. Hence we can consider as if Bob
applied such an operation on S2 immediately after he
preparing ρ.
In short, we can assume that Bob’s attack is a ran-
dom Pauli attack on the correct state |ΨP 〉 as is shown
in Eq. (1). Hence let us focus on σα|ΨP 〉. For many
quantum error correcting code (such as the topological
one [14, 15]), if the weight |α| of σα is less than a certain
integer d (the code distance), then such an error is de-
tected or does not change logical states [2, 14, 15, 17]. For
example, in the topological code, d is determined by the
defect thickness and distance between defects [14, 15].
Here, the weight |α| of σα means the number of non-
trivial operators in σα. (For example, the weight of
I ⊗ XZ ⊗ Z ⊗ I ⊗ X is 3.) Therefore, in order for σα
to change a logical state of the computation, |α| must be
larger than d. (To understand it, let us consider a sim-
ple example. If we encode the logical 0 as |0L〉 ≡ |000〉
and the logical 1 as |1L〉 ≡ |111〉, we must flip more than
two qubits to change the logical state. A single bit flip is
detected and corrected when the majority vote is done.)
Alice randomly chooses a permutation P . In this
case, the probability of P †σαP not changing any trap
is at most (23 )
|α|/3. (For a calculation, see Ap-
pendix C). Therefore, the probability that the logi-
cal state is changed and no trap is flipped is at most∑
|α|≥d C˜α
(
2
3
)|α|/3
≤
(
2
3
)d/3∑
|α|≥d C˜α ≤
(
2
3
)d/3
, where
we have used the fact C˜α ≥ 0 and
∑
|α|≥d C˜α ≤
∑
α C˜α =
1. Here, we have said “at most”, since the above sum in-
cludes the contribution from σα which has a weight larger
than d but does not contain any logical error. In this way,
we have shown that the probability that Alice is fooled
by Bob is exponentially small (d can be sufficiently large
by concatenating the code). As we have seen, no com-
munication from Alice to Bob is required for the verifi-
cation. Therefore, whatever Alice’s measurement device
does, Bob cannot learn Alice’s computational informa-
tion because of the no-signaling principle. In other words,
the security of the protocol is device-independent.
V. SECOND PROTOCOL
Let us explain our second protocol, which uses the
property of the topological code, and does not use any
trap. Alice randomly chooses k ≡ (h1, ..., hN , t1, ..., tN ) ∈
{0, 1}2N , and defines the N -qubit operator Kk ≡⊗N
j=1 T
tj
j H
hj
j , where T ≡ |0〉〈0| + i|1〉〈1| and H is
the Hadamard operator. Note that T †XT = −iXZ,
T †ZT = Z, and T †XZT = −iX . Next, Alice defines
the N -qubit state |Ψk〉 ≡ Kk|RHG
′〉, where |RHG′〉 is
the N -qubit Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal state [14, 15]
with sufficient number of magic states being already dis-
tilled [14, 15].
Bob prepares a universal resource state, and sends each
qubit of it to Alice one by one. Alice does measurements
and creates σq|Ψk〉 in Bob’s laboratory, where σq is the
byproduct of the measurement-based quantum computa-
tion. Due to the no-signaling principle, Bob cannot learn
k. Bob sends each qubit of σq |Ψk〉 to Alice one by one,
and Alice does her topological measurement-based quan-
tum computation with correcting σqKk. If Alice detects
any error, she aborts the protocol.
Again, because of Eq. (1), we can assume that Bob’s
attack is a random Pauli attack. Therefore let us focus
on σα|Ψk〉. In order for σα to change a logical state
without being detected by syndrome measurements, σα
must contain at least one string sα of operators which
connects or surrounds defects (Fig. 1 (c)) [14, 15, 17].
4Since Alice randomly chooses k, the probability that all
operators in K†ksαKk become Z or XZ operators is at
most (34 )
|sα|, where |sα| is the weight of sα. Note that
|sα| ≥ d because it connects or surrounds defects.
Hence, the probability that the logical state is
changed and Alice does not detect any error is at most∑
|α|≥d C˜α
(
3
4
)|sα|
≤
(
3
4
)d∑
|α|≥d C˜α ≤
(
3
4
)d
. In short,
our second protocol is also verifiable. Again, the device-
independent security is guaranteed by the no-signaling
principle.
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Appendix A: Existence of a CPTP map
Let {|φk〉}
2N
k=1 be any orthonormal basis of the
N -qubit Hilbert space, 〈φk|φj〉 = δk,j . We diago-
nalize the N -qubit state ρ as ρ =
∑2N
j=1 λj |λj〉〈λj |.
Let us take Ejk ≡
√
λj |λj〉〈φk|. Then for any N -
qubit state η =
∑
α,β ηαβ |φα〉〈φβ |,
∑
j,k EjkηE
†
jk =∑
j,k,α,β
√
λj
√
λjηαβ |λj〉〈φk|φα〉〈φβ |φk〉〈λj | =∑
j,k λjηkk|λj〉〈λj | = ρ. Furthermore,
∑
j,k E
†
jkEjk =∑
j,k
√
λj
√
λj |φk〉〈λj |λj〉〈φk| =
∑
j,k λj |φk〉〈φk| = I.
Appendix B: Proof of Eq. (2)
For the convenience of readers, we here give the
proof [19] of Eq. (2). Since α 6= β, there exists an
index j such that σα|j 6= σβ |j . For any such σα|j
and σβ |j , we can always take S ∈ {X,Z} such that S
anticommutes only one of σα|j and σ
†
β |j . Let us define
Q ≡ I⊗j−1 ⊗ S ⊗ I⊗N−j . Then,
∑
q σ
†
qσασqρσ
†
qσ
†
βσq =∑
q(Qσq)
†σα(Qσq)ρ(Qσq)†σ
†
β(Qσq) =∑
q(σ
†
qQ
†)σα(Qσq)ρ(σ†qQ
†)σ†β(Qσq) =
−
∑
q σ
†
qσασqρσ
†
qσ
†
βσq.
Appendix C: Probability of avoiding traps
Let σα|j be the restriction of σα for jth qubit. (For
example, (X ⊗ I ⊗ XZ)|3 is XZ.) Let a, b, c be the
number of j such that σα|j = X , Z, XZ, respectively.
(In other words, a is the number of X operators in σα, b
is the number of Z operators in σα, and c is the number
of XZ operators in σα.) We define |α| be the weight of
σα, namely, the number of non-I operators. Since |α| =
a+ b+ c ≤ 3max(a, b, c), we obtain max(a, b, c) ≥ |α|3 .
Let us assume max(a, b, c) = a. Then, the proba-
bility that all X operators of σα do not change any
trap is
(N−a)!∏a−1
k=0
( 2N
3
−k)
N ! =
(
2
3
)a ∏a−1
k=0
(N− 3
2
k)
∏a−1
k=0
(N−k) ≤
(
2
3
)a
≤
(
2
3
)|α|/3
. This is larger than the probability that σα does
not change any trap.
We can obtain the same result for max(a, b, c) = b. For
max(a, b, c) = c, we have only to replace 23 with
1
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